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Hopwood and Its Consequences
Michael S. Greve*
The Fifth Circuit's March 1996 decision that the University
of Texas Law School may not use race as a factor in student
admissions sent shockwaves through the world of higher education.' In the wake of the United States Supreme Court's failure
* Executive Director, Center for Individual Rights (CIR); Ph.D. (Government),
Cornell University, 1987. CIR has served since 1993 as co-counsel to Cheryl Hopwood and Douglas Wade Carvell in Hopwood v. State of Texas.
1. Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 84 F.3d 720
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). For reactions to the case see, e.g., A
Stunning Blow, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., March 29, 1996 (majority of issue dedicated to the Hopwood decision and reaction to it); Tom Morganthau & Ginny Carroll, The Backlash Wars, NEWSWEEK, April 1, 1996, at 54 (Mark Yudof, Provost at
the University of Texas, describing Hopwood as "the A-bomb"); Joan Biskupic,
Texas Diversity Policy Overturned; U.S. Appeals Court Rules Campus Admissions
Plan Unconstitutional,WASH. POST, March 20, 1996, A01, available in 1996 WL
3069879 (John C. Jeffries of the University of Virginia Law School calling Hopwood "incredibly big"); Linda Ponce Campbell, UT Law School Case FuelsAffirmative Action Opposition, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, March 24, 1996, at 5,
available in 1996 WL 5529109 (Sanford Levinson, University of Texas Law School,
calling Fifth Circuit's decision "a full-scale declaration of war"); Todd Ackerman,
A&M Puts All Admissions Decisions on Hold, HOUSTON CHRON., March 22, 1996,
at 25, available in 1996 WL 5588475 (Barry Thompson, Texas A&M Chancellor,
predicting that Hopwood "will have more impact than any other education opinion
of the last 20 years").
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to review the Circuit's opinion,2 colleges and universities under
the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction will have to dismantle overtly
race-conscious admissions programs. Elsewhere in the country,
political pressures and threats of future litigation will prompt
at least some universities to revise transparently discrimina3
tory policies.
Defenders of racial preferences have emphasized that Hopwood binds only institutions inside the Fifth Circuit and perhaps only the University of Texas Law School, 4 and they have
sought solace in the fact that the Supreme Court has yet to take
the final step of explicitly and unequivocally disavowing the "diversity" rationale of Justice Powell's lone opinion in Board of
Regents v. Bakke. 5 But these efforts to keep hope alive will
prove futile. Judge Jerry Smith's trenchant opinion for the
2. 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
3. In November, 1996, the voters of California passed the California Civil
Rights Initiative (CCRI), a state constitutional amendment prohibiting state agencies from administering race- or sex-based preferences in public employment, education, and contracting. The Attorneys General of Colorado and Georgia have
urged public colleges in their states to dismantle racial preferences. See Patrick
Healy, California Colleges Will Stop Designing Some Classes For Specific Ethnic
Groups, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 21, 1996 (Colorado Attorney General urging end to affirmative action in state higher education); Georgia Colleges Ordered
to Drop Racial Preferences, WASH. POST, April 10, 1996 at A20, available in 1996
WL 3073481. See also Peter Van Tyle, The Other Shoe Drops, COMMUNITY C. J.,
June/July 1996, at 28, 31 ("Schools outside the Fifth Circuit would be wise to revisit their race-conscious admissions systems. The stakes are too great to do
otherwise.").
4. Professor Laurence Tribe, counsel for the University of Texas in the Hopwood defendants' petition for Supreme Court review, has claimed that Hopwood
has "'no implications' for colleges outside Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi."
Douglas Lederman and Stephen Burd, High Court Refuses to HearAppeal of Ruling That Barred ConsideringRace in Admissions, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July
12, 1996, at A25. In addition, Tribe has argued that if colleges within the Fifth
Circuit "use the Fifth Circuit's dictum as an excuse to completely eliminate all uses
of race, even as a factor, they will certainly be doing so of a matter of choice rather
than compulsion." Id. See also Sanford Levinson, Public Forum-What They're
Saying ... About the Supreme Court and Hopwood vs. UT Law School; High Court
Puts UT at a Disadvantage,AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, July 3, 1996, at A13, available in 1996 WL 3435206 (quoting Sanford Levinson of the University of Texas
School of Law, "[o]ne can argue that its [Hopwood's] effect is limited to the University of Texas Law School, given that no other school was part of the litigation");
Ellen Bernstein, HispanicEducators Wrestle With Hopwood Case Fallout,CoRPus
CHRISTI CALLER-TIMES, July 9, 1996 (attorney for the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund said "that the ruling only applies to the admission system at the University of Texas Law School.").
5. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Fifth Circuit-arguably the first unambiguous, forthright judicial endorsement of official colorblindness in three decadeshas blown a huge hole in the "diversity" defense on which racial
preferences in higher education have been based. Perhaps even
more fatefully, the Hopwood litigation itself-the issues it
raised and the facts it brought to light-has undermined public
support for affirmative action. This erosion will continue. A
decade or so from now, Hopwood will be remembered as the be6
ginning of the end of affirmative action in higher education.
I.
Racial preference policies are supported by entrenched bureaucracies and by powerful interest groups. These constituencies have responded to Hopwood with a mixture of outrage,
denial, and defiance. Higher education officials have urged institutions outside the Fifth Circuit to preserve racial preferences. 7 Given the higher education establishment's iron
commitment to racial "diversity," universities need no such encouragement; one must frankly doubt that they will readily
comply with court-imposed restrictions on racial preference policies. Even institutions within the Fifth Circuit, which in the
1950s and 1960s tried to evade even the clearest judicial orders
to cease discrimination,8 may prove willing and able to do so
again-for example, by applying admissions criteria that,
though not overtly racial, provide a proxy for prohibited racial
classifications. 9
6. Throughout, I use the terms "racial preferences" and "affirmative action"
interchangeably. I perceive no constitutional objection to "affirmative action" that
does not involve preferences based on race or other suspect classifications.
7. See Patrick Healy, EducationDepartment Urges Public Colleges to Keep Affirmative Action Programs,CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 3, 1996, at A27; HIGHER
EDUC. & NAT'L AFFAIRS July 29, 1996, at 1 (letter signed by President of American
Council on Education and endorsed by over 30 higher education associations urges
colleges and universities to maintain affirmative action programs).
8. See, e.g. Meredith v. Fair, 306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1962), af/d 83 S. Ct. 10
(1962) (unsuccessful petition for stay of court order to admit black student to segregated university).
9. Such strategies are unlawful: the Fifth Circuit's opinion permits schools to
consider factors that correlate with race but not for the purpose of racialdiscrimination. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946. However, reverse discrimination plaintiffs
would find it expensive and difficult to prove a discriminatory purpose behind the
use of ostensibly neutral criteria.
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Even massive institutional resistance, however, cannot preserve racial preferences indefinitely. Bureaucratic recalcitrance
and interest group opposition often suffice to ensure the survival of regulatory or entitlement programs. Affirmative action,
however, is no ordinary policy. It stirs deep passions and raises
profound questions of constitutional principle and American
governance, and cannot be sustained without a credible public
defense and explanation. The higher education establishment
is perfectly aware of this fact. 10 Certainly, the Hopwood defendants were aware of it: throughout the litigation, the University
of Texas (UT) and its attorneys accompanied their legal strategies with a concerted public relations campaign to explain and
defend the Law School's admission policies.
In orchestrating this campaign, UT invoked the standard
defenses of affirmative action in higher education: historical
discrimination and educational diversity. These twin pillars
were shaky even before Hopwood. Arguably, they were never
more than stage props designed to camouflage racial proportionalism. Outside the formerly segregationist South, remedial
justifications for preferential admissions have always been suspect, and the general practice of extending systematic, sizeable
preferences to selected racial minorities but not to others who
might bring unique and underrepresented perspectives to the
campus (say, religious conservatives), makes it doubtful that
racial preferences were ever meant to enhance the educational,
intellectual diversity celebrated in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion." Still, the pillars of lingering discrimination and diversity
looked sufficiently stable and imposing to deter a full-fledged assault on the affirmative action edifice.
As I will show, however, the Hopwood litigation brought
the reality of racial preferences to public attention and into
10. See, e.g., Douglas Lederman, College Leaders Plan Strategy to Defend Affirmative Action, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 31, 1996, at A24 (pending Hop-

wood litigation spurs Harvard conference of higher education officials discussing
better ways of explaining benefits of racial diversity); Martin Michaelson, A Time
to IncreasePublic UnderstandingofAffirmative Action, CHRON.

OF

HIGHER EDUC.,

July 19, 1996 ("Educators must make the case for affirmative action themselves;
the courts are unlikely to do it for them.").
11. Needless to say, I do not mean to advocate preferences for intellectually
"underrepresented" viewpoints or perspectives. See Eugene Volokh, Diversity,
Race As Proxy, And Religion As Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059 (1996).
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sharp focus; and as the facts came to light, "discrimination" and
"diversity" came tumbling down. Thus, without altogether disavowing these traditional rationales, UT officials and attorneys
raised a third and, at the time, virtually unprecedented defense:
they presented racial preferences as the only possible means of
averting a "lily-white law school" and the "resegregation" of
higher education.2 In the wake of Hopwood, this line of argument-call it the "resegregation defense"-has become the education establishment's last line of resistance. It is not a viable
defense, however, and it may even hasten the demise of racial
preferences.
II.
Cheryl Hopwood and her fellow-plaintiffs applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School's incoming 1992
class. In that year, as in the years before and since, the Law
School sought to enroll a class containing five percent black and
ten percent Mexican-American students. In order to achieve
this "aspiration," the school administered drastically lower admissions standards for the preferred minorities than for all
other applicants. The Hopwood litigation showed that the Law
School's policies cannot be justified either as an attempt to rectify past discrimination or as a means of ensuring "diversity."
A. Past Discrimination
The Fifth Circuit categorically rejected the Hopwood defendants' contention that the Law School's past discrimination
against blacks or Mexican-Americans led to the Law School's
current problems-in particular, the paucity of highly qualified
minority applicants and recurrent racial tensions at the
school. 13 There is a certain symbolic quality in the fact that UT
Law School, which ended segregation only under an order from
12. The school's legal defense further asserted that the plaintiffs lacked stand-

ing, that the Law School's racial enrollment "targets" were required by the Education Department's Office for Civil Rights, and that the "targets" were necessary to
secure the school's accreditation by the American Association of Law Schools and
the American Bar Association. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 567 & 570
n.56 (W.D. Tex. 1994). I will ignore these and other ancillary defenses. They do
not go to the substantive merits of the Law School's affirmative action program;
they are plainly inadequate to build public support for affirmative action; and they
were dismissed without much hesitation by the courts. See id.
13. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953.
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the Supreme Court, 14 has become the first educational institution to be told that it must now cease decades of discrimination
in favor of minorities. 15 The ruling also has a definitive quality:
if UT Law School with its notorious past cannot rely on historical discrimination as a predicate for preferential admissions,
then no institution of higher learning (except possibly a few
schools in the deep South) can rely on a remedial rationale for
16
affirmative action.
That said, though, the Fifth Circuit's decision on the inadequacy of the past-discrimination argument cannot have surprised the Hopwood defendants. The weakness of the remedial
rationale has been obvious for at least a decade: as the history
of segregation recedes further into the distant past, it becomes
progressively harder to document its present effects. The Hopwood defendants could assert a remedial rationale only by defining "discrimination" (and its perpetrators and victims) so
broadly as to render it virtually indistinguishable from the attenuated, "societal" discrimination that the Supreme Court has
found time and again to be an impermissible predicate for raceconscious "remedies." 7 By way of illustration, after more than
two decades of discrimination in favor of preferred minorities,
the claim that UT Law School still needs racial preferences to
compensate for present effects of its own past discrimination
was incredible on its face. The defense experts' testimony on
14. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
15. The symbolic quality of Hopwood has been noted in numerous news articles and feature stories. See, e.g., Bill Adler, From Sweatt to Hopwood, TEx. OBSERVER, April 5, 1996, at 4; William M. Adler, Evening the Score, ROLLING STONE,
August 10, 1995; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Texas v. Hopwood, (No. 95-1773), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996);
Petition For Writ of Certiorari at 10-17, Thurgood Marshall Legal Society and
Black Pre-Law Association v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
16. See, e.g., Affirmative Action Loses College Case, MiAMi HERALD, March 20,
1996, Al (quoting Allan Van Fleet, counsel for the Hopwood defendants, "Ifdiversity cannot be a legitimate goal in Texas, given its past history, there is no place in
the country for affirmative action.").
17. "... . [A] state does not have a compelling state interest in remedying the
present effects of past societal discrimination.... ."Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 949. "Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276
(1986). See also, Podberesky v. Kirwin, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (funding singlerace scholarship program found unconstitutional because perceived present "effects" such as school's bad reputation among minorities were not significantly related to past discrimination by the university).
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the alleged present effects of past discrimination-such as the
Law School's alleged reputation as a racist institution among
potential minority applicants' 8-proved nothing except the trial
lawyers' adage that one can find experts to testify to practically
anything. 19
In short, the remedial rationale was not a promising legal
argument for the defendants. Furthermore, it did not provide a
viable strategy to persuade the public of the continued necessity
for racial preferences. The American public has long ceased to
believe that the problems that plague black Americans are principally attributable to past or present discrimination, that race
preferences are the answer to those problems, or that the sins of
their fathers should be visited upon their sons and daughters.
B. Diversity
Throughout the Hopwood litigation, the defendants admitted, as they must, that the Law School took race into account in
the interest of attaining a racially diverse student body. The
defendants insisted, however, in public and in court, that the
school was not administering racial "double standards," "unlawful preferences" or "quotas." This stratagem, of course, relied on
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, which prohibited racial quotas and set-asides but permitted educational institutions to consider race a "plus" factor, in the same "individualized" manner
that an applicant's extracurricular activities, home state, or
20
other attributes may be taken into account.
In his Hopwood opinion, Judge Smith found that "diversity"
was not a compelling state interest that would justify racial
preferences, thus effectively declaring Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion a dead letter.2 ' Without diminishing the significance of
Judge Smith's much-debated opinion, however, even a contrary
ruling would not have solved the Hopwood defendants' more
fundamental problem: the diversity defense was untruthful to
18. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952-53; 861 F. Supp. at 572.
19. Consider only the obvious fact that institutions that have never discriminated are confronted with the same minority recruitment problems as is UT Law
School.
20. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-17.
21. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 941-48 (Justice Powell's lone opinion in Bakke was
never the law of the land, and recent Supreme Court decisions have confirmed that
race-conscious policies must be strictly confined to remedial settings).

7

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:1

begin with. The facts showed that the school's admission preferences-in substance, if not in all procedural details, similar to
those administered by comparable law schools 22 -were quotas
in all but name. The two charts shown below, along with a brief
explanation, make the point.
Chart I is a breakdown of 1992 law school applicants from
Texas by race and by the applicant's "Texas Index" ("TI"-lefthand scale).23 The TI, a composite of the applicant's weighted
GPA and LSAT scores, served as the school's principal (though
not exclusive) admission criterion. For each of the three listed
racial groups (Blacks, Mexican-Americans, and "Other," a category that included such minorities as Asians and non-MexicanAmerican Hispanics), the dean of admissions determined a,
"presumptive admit" score (Lines A) and a "presumptive deny"
score (Lines B). These scores ensured virtually automatic admission or rejection, respectively, with only a cursory review of
the files by a single admission officer. Applicant files in the "discretionary" zones (scores between Lines A and B) were reviewed
in greater detail by faculty admission committees. The Hopwood plaintiffs' TI scores placed them at the upper end of the
"discretionary" range; their files were reviewed, and their appli24
cations were rejected.
22. See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 576 n.72 (characterizing expert testimony).
23. Texas residents comprised 85% of the incoming 1992 class, and all of the
Hopwood plaintiffs were Texas residents. 861 F. Supp. at 564. The school's admission process for out-of-state applicants was substantially the same as for Texas
residents, the major differences being that (a) the TI scores required for admission
were higher for each racial group (Black/Mexican-American/Other) and that (b)
the cut-off scores for Mexican-American applicants were substantially higher than
those for blacks and in fact almost the same as for "others." See Hopwood, 861 F.
Supp. at 561 n.22. In other words, while the resident system favored blacks and
Mexican-Americans, the non-resident system was designed to benefit blacks
alone. See id. There are two corresponding TI scales because one component of the
TI, the LSAT, changed from one scoring system to another in the preceding year.
Some applicants submitted "old," others a "new" LSAT score. Id. See 861 F. Supp.
at 561 n.25.
24. Three of the plaintiffs had a TI score of 197. Hopwood, 862 F. Supp. at
564. Cheryl Hopwood had a TI score of 199, placing her in the "presumptive admit" group. Id. A cursory review of her file indicated that she earned her high
GPA at undergraduate institutions the admission officer considered uncompetitive; along with a handful of other presumptive admits, her application was
bumped down into the discretionary group. See 861 F. Supp. at 564-65. After further review, Hopwood was placed on a wait list and eventually declined a belated
offer of admission. Id.
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As the chart shows, the Law School administered substantially lower "presumptive admit" scores for members of the preferred minorities. In fact, the presumptive admit score for the
preferred minorities (189) was lower than the presumptive deny
score for "Others" (192). This double standard was necessary to
attain the "aspiration" of enrolling five percent black and ten
percent Mexican-American students. 25 Chart II illustrates the
effects of the differential standards on the Texas resident appli26
cants' chances of admission.
University of Texas Law School
Percent of Resident Applicants Admitted for 1992-93
100
89
80

a

= 60

S40
•32

20

7X"
202

OVER 199

193-198

189-192

180-188

Texas Index Score
E] Other

11 Mexican American

[

Black

Note that "Other" applicants in the discretionary zone (TI
193-198) had roughly a one-in-two chance of admission,
whereas all preferred minority candidates in the same range
were admitted. In the range just below, the chances of admission were 100% for blacks and a mere six percent for "Others,"
reflecting the already-noted fact that the "presumptive" admis25. See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at

563.

26. Pl.'s Ex., P-142, Hopwood.
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sion score for black applicants was lower than the "presumptive" denial score for "Others." Thus, applicants in the 189-192
TI range were admitted or rejected with only a passing glance
at their applications, based solely on their race.
III.
As a member of the UT Law School faculty admitted in an
unguarded moment, the admissions policy just described was
"in essence, a quota system."27 The "aspiration" of enrolling five
and ten percent blacks and Mexican-Americans, respectively,
drove the entire process; notably, it compelled the racial differences inthe presumptive TI scores that played such a large role
in determining the chances of admission. Race was not a Powell-type "plus factor" or "tie breaker" in close cases; it made all
the difference in case after case. 28
This revelation effectively forecloses the diversity gambit or
"Bakke straddle" that has for almost two decades formed the
core of the diversity defense. Relying on Justice Powell's distinction between "quotas" and "plus factors," the higher education establishment liberally interpreted Powell's opinion in
Bakke to mean that so long as there is no formal quota or setaside, and so long as applicant files are not physically separated
by race, race is a legitimate consideration. Even if the "plus factor" serves the purpose of producing a pre-determined number
of minority admissions, and even if it is so large as to swamp
every other variable.
The Hopwood defendants attempted precisely this maneuver. On the eve of the trial, the school changed its admission
policy, jettisoning the race-based cut-off scores and the use of a
separate minority admission subcommittee. The defendants
then argued that the demise of these transparently discriminatory practices rendered the school's admissions process consistent with Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. Whatever the legal
27. Pl.'s Ex. P-22, Hopwood (memorandum from faculty member to members
of the law school admission committee).
28. I assume for the sake of the argument that Justice Powell's distinction
between a marginal "plus" and a "decisive" preference is meaningful. See Bakke,
438 U.S. at 317-18. If the distinction is meaningless (since even a small "plus" will
be decisive in the marginal case), Justice Powell's diversity argument is incoherent
and the argument in the text is true a fortiori.
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merits of this contention, though, the facts in Hopwood show
that the school's last-minute policy changes were merely cosmetic: so long as the "targets" drive the admissions process,
they will remain quotas in all but name. 29 The abolition of formal cut-off scores and of a separate minority admissions committee may make the admission process more arbitrary and the
racial preferences more opaque, but it does absolutely nothing
to reduce the scope of racial preferences. In other words, the
distinction between "quotas" and "set-asides" on the one hand
and "targets," "aspirations" and "plus factors" on the other is an
empty formalism. Post-Hopwood, the distinction can no longer
be relied upon to provide a plausible defense of racial admissions preferences.
Along with the diversity gambit, the facts of the Hopwood
case vitiate all the other evasions that have for so long characterized the defense of affirmative action. For instance, affirmative action proponents often maintain that standardized
admissions criteria, such as the TI, are a poor proxy for merit
and an inadequate means of determining who would or would
not make a good law student or lawyer. 30 This may be so. 31 But

there is no explanation other than rank discrimination for the
29. See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 574 (sustaining minority "targets"). When
the trial court upheld this position, the defendants gloated over their victory and
described the changes in the Law School's admission procedures as "procedural
rather than substantive. We've changed procedures and he's [Judge Sparks] indicated the new procedures pass constitutional muster." Ken Myers, UTAdmissions
Plaintiffs Say Ruling Shortchanges Them, NAT'L LAw J., September 5, 1994 (quoting UT Law School Dean Michael M. Sharlot). In one of the defense's numerous
about-faces, UT officials, who first minimized the changes to the admissions procedures, suggested on appeal that the changes were meaningful. See Defendants'
Amended and Annotated Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 31,
Hopwood (A-92-CA-563-55) (citing changes in admissions policy as basis for denying injunctive relief). They had it right the first time around.
30. See, e.g. Michael A. Olivas, The Decision Is Flatly, Unequivocally Wrong,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., March 29, 1996, at B3 (arguing that test scores are poor
indicators of minority performance); and Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22-24.
See Petition For Writ, Thurgood Marshall Legal Society (citing statement of Dr.
Shapiro on the inadequacy of standardized tests in evaluating minorities).
31. Contrary to the Hopwood defendants' suggestions, the plaintiffs never
suggested that law schools had to admit "strictly on the numbers." Hopwood, 78
F.3d at 946. Nor did the Fifth Circuit require such a policy. Id. (schools may take
numerous factors into account, including factors that correlate race). Whatever
the merits of a test score-driven admission policy might be, it is obviously not a
constitutional requirement.
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Law School's policy of attributing great significance to the TI for
comparisons within each racial category (so that six points
spelled the difference between virtually automatic acceptance
and instant rejection) while treating the scores as meaningless
in comparisons across racial groups.
Similarly, glib assurances that everyone admitted to the
school was "qualified,"32 that non-minority applicants less qualified (numerically speaking) than the plaintiffs were offered admission,3 3 and that minority preferences displaced "only" a
handful of "Other" applicants, are no longer persuasive. There
have always been ready responses to such claims.3 4 The most
devastating response, however, lies in the incontrovertible fact
that Cheryl Hopwood and her fellow-plaintiffs would have been
admitted, had they been black.3 5
IV.
In the end, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the
Law School's preference policies served no other purpose than
racial balancing for its own sake. Even assuming that past discrimination or diversity provided UT Law School with a "compelling" rationale, the school could not explain how its policies
were tailored to either of these purposes. Why, for instance, did
more than half of the beneficiaries of a policy ostensibly
designed to remedy discrimination by the state of Texas come
from outside Texas? 36 And what plausible conception of educational diversity would compel the enrollment of five percent
blacks but twice as many Mexican-Americans (and utter indifference to the racial composition of the rest of the class)? 3 7
32. See, e.g. Douglas Laycock, "UTs Color-ConsciousSystem," TEX. LAw. Nov.
29, 1993, at 20.
33. Olivas, supra note 30, at B3.
34. To mention only the most painfully obvious response: we would not even
deign to discuss similar claims if they were made in defense of discrimination
against minorities.
35. See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 580-82.
36. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955, n.50; Trial Testimony, Vol. 2, at 15.
37. [Bllacks and Mexican Americans are but two among any number of racial or ethnic groups that could and presumably should contribute to genuine diversity.... I concede that the law school's 1992 admissions process
would increase the percentages of black faces and brown faces in that year's
entering class. But facial diversity is not true diversity, and a system thus
conceived and implemented is not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity.
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It was probably in light of the glaring weaknesses of the
remedial and diversity defenses that the Hopwood defendants
decided to make a virtue of necessity and to come clean about
the school's interest in ensuring racial balance. They asserted
this interest in the most drastic possible form: as an imperative
need to prevent "resegregation" and the specter of a "lily-white
law school."
This was not a legal argument in any conventional sense.
However murky civil rights law may be in many of its particulars, not only is racial balancing for its own sake not a compelling government purpose; it is the unconstitutional purpose par
excellence.38 No federal judge can ignore the numerous precedents to this effect.3 9 The resegregation defense is at heart a
political argument, designed for the political purpose of confronting courts and the public with the allegedly intolerable
consequences of the demise of racial preferences.
Many affirmative action proponents still attempt to play
the diversity gambit: concede that some schools (including UT
Law School) may have gone "too far" in the direction of quotas,
acknowledge the need for reform, but continue to defend ostensibly more modest efforts to promote "diversity" by "taking race
into account." Mend it, don't end it (to coin a phrase). It is a
measure of Hopwood's impact to have wrung even these concessions and the accompanying call for an "honest Bakke regime"
from such liberal stalwarts as Anthony Lewis 40 and from an esHopwood, 78 F.3d at 966 (Wiener, J., concurring). Judge Wiener correctly added
that the defendants' "diversity" and "past discrimination arguments" contradicted
each other. Id. at 966 n.24.
38. If [the university's] purpose is to assure within its student body some
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial
but as facially invalid. Preferring members of any one group for no reason
other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the
Constitution forbids.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
39. Although the district judge presiding in Hopwood came close to doing so.
See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp at 571 n.60.
40. Anthony Lewis, Q & A, SAN DIEGo TRIB., April 7, 1996, at G5 (promotes
looking at whole person, rather than applying "mechanical" standard utilized by
the University of Texas Law School). See also Peter Schrag, Courts Will Do Much
to Shape Future of Affirmative Action, Civic CENTER NEwsouRCE, May 13, 1996;

WASH. POST, Decision on Diversity, March 24, 1996, at C6 (calls for genuine diversity without using racial double standards).
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tablishment that had heretofore denied the very existence of
quotas, while expressing unflinching opposition to such things.
But Hopwood has done more: for reasons already suggested, it
has rendered the diversity gambit inviable as a matter of public
debate. The clear import of the defendants' argument in Hopwood was that modest "plus factors" will only marginally increase the number of minority admits. 41 If "honest" plus factors
do not produce "meaningful" diversity, we might as well go colorblind. Preferences with more-than-marginal effects on minority enrollment, on the other hand, will turn right back into the
thinly disguised quotas the higher education establishment administered from Bakke to Hopwood.
This regime, however, is doomed. It always depended on
secrecy and deceit: there had to be at least a half-way plausible
pretense that racial preferences weren't double standards. Precisely for this reason, universities treated admissions data and
statistics as closely guarded state secrets, to the point of persecuting whistleblowers. 42 Of course, rumors leaked out, and anyone familiar with higher education knew the truth all along.
But Hopwood has finally revealed the truth before the public
and robbed the higher education establishment of the last shred
of plausible deniability. Once the facts are known, the comparison of racial "diversity" preferences to the consideration of an
41. Chart I illustrates the following, rough calculation: There were eight
black applicants in the discretionary range for "Others." The normal chance of
admission in this range was about one in two, meaning that about four black applicants would have been admitted under a wholly race-blind system. The "honest"
use of a racial "plus factor" or "tie breaker" would have resulted in offers of admission to the remaining four black applicants in the discretionary range. In the presumptive deny range below, no candidate had more than a very small chance of
admission. In short, "honest" Bakke-type preferences would have produced no
more than an additional four or five black admits from Texas and perhaps two or
three more from out-of-state.
42. For example, when a student at Georgetown University Law School wrote
an article on racial double standards in admissions policies, which he discovered
while working for the admissions office, the school threatened to expel the student.
See Double Standardat Georgetown, N.Y. POST, April 20, 1991; Robin Wilson, Student's Article Roils Georgetown U. Law Center, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., April 24,
1994; Georgetown Law Student Disciplined, Will Graduate, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., May 29, 1991. A similar incident occurred at the University of Miami
School of Law, where a columnist for the student newspaper was disciplined for
having admissions records, which he was going to use for an article on affirmative
action. See Frances Robles, ConservationLaw Student Brings Furorto Forefront,
M
rMI
HERALD, October 1, 1995, at lB.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss1/1

16

19961

HOPWOOD

applicant's community service or trumpet-playing skills looks
as preposterous in public as it has always been in fact.
Post-Hopwood, continued insistence on the Bakke defense
is in effect a bet that the country can be fooled once more. Some
like the odds on this bet. 43 But the higher education establishment does not, and for good reason: once the secret is out, there
is no going back. Hence, the establishment has followed the
path marked by the Hopwood defendants in the course of the
litigation: having denied for decades that racial preferences
play much of a role in admissions, the establishment now asserts that such preferences account for virtually all admissions
of black and Hispanic applicants. For a notable example, when
the Regents of the University of California moved to dismantle
affirmative action in student admissions, university administrators fought back by pointing to the allegedly catastrophic effects on black and Latino student enrollment. 44 From a halfhearted defense of "plus factors," the establishment has moved
to defending racial preferences of any size and under any name
as the only alternative to "re-segregation" and "lily-white law
schools."
This resegregation defense-the orthodox post-Hopwood
defense of affirmative action in higher education-has an apparent strength, which lies in its almost brutal forthrightness:
here, at long last, is the true rationale for racial preferences,
shorn of all pretenses and prevarications. It is not entirely
wrong to expect that the public will be uncomfortable with elite
institutions that lack meaningful black and, to some extent,
Hispanic representation. Squarely confronted with the specter,
voters may prefer to be fooled once more and continue to acquiesce in racial preferences, at least so long as they remain
opaque and limited. For several reasons, however, the resegregation defense will not rescue the ancien regime of affirmative
action.
43. Among them is the President of the United States. See Memorandum on
Affrmative Action, 31 WEEKLY Coup. PREs. Doc. 1245, 1264 (July 19, 1995).
44. See, e.g., University of California, Office of the President, The Use of SocioEconomic Status in Place of Ethnicity in UndergraduateAdmissions: A Report on
the Results of an Exploratory Computer Simulation, May 1995 [hereinafter Computer Simulation]. See also Douglas Lederman, Colleges Forced to ConsiderEnding Use of Race in Admissions, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 19, 1996, at A27.

17

PACE LAW REVIEW
A.

[Vol. 17:1

Illegality

The public defense of racial preferences on remedial and diversity grounds was by and large congruous with the legal defenses that were presumed to be available. Not so with the resegregation defense: as already suggested, the Hopwood defendants' aggressive assertion of a flagrantly unconstitutional
government purpose was not a legal strategy. Instead, it was
an attempt to confront the court with the purportedly unacceptable, "resegregationist" consequences of an adverse decisionand then to kick up a cloud of dust ("Diversity! Past discrimination!") to permit a moderately graceful escape from constitutional norms. Now and then, the resegregation scare may
induce a district judge to shrink from applying constitutional
norms. 45 In the end, however, and irrespective of future judicial
appointments, it will be impossible to gain judicial endorsement
of racial proportionalism as a compelling government purpose.
B.

Public Opposition

Opinion polls conducted over almost two decades have
shown a remarkably consistent and deep public resistance to
racial preferences. While there is public support for "soft" affirmative action (such as outreach and recruitment efforts), this
support dissipates (and hostility towards racial minorities increases) when explicit preferences enter the picture. 46 The resegregation defense relies precisely on a public disclosure of explicit racial preferences, and it supposes that the public will
swallow preferences of whatever scope and description to avert
the dreaded consequence of "lily-white schools." This supposition is clearly erroneous. In June 1996, in the midst of the Hopwood defendants' PR campaign about the specter of
"resegregation," over eighty percent of Texas voters, including
45. See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570-71 n.60. The strategy is most likely to
make an impression in district courts, especially if the defendant-university happens to be powerful, prestigious, and a dominant player in the local establishment.
(Places like Charlottesville, Virginia and Columbus, Ohio come to mind.) The
strategy is much less likely to work in appellate courts, which are somewhat more
removed from the direct consequences of their decisions and which, owing to their
higher institutional prestige, are less reluctant to confront establishment
institutions.
46. See Jack Citrin, Affirmative Action in the People's Court, THE PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1996, at 40-41.
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almost two-thirds of blacks and almost three-quarters of Hispanics, said that universities should not take race into account
in student admissions4 7
C. The Murray Problem
The resegregation defense implicitly asserts that blacks
cannot compete for admission to elite institutions without special preferences (and that not much can be done about the problem, at least for the foreseeable future). To put it polemically:
it is difficult to raise the specter of "lily-white institutions" without sounding like Charles Murray (or, more precisely, without
sounding the way Charles Murray has been understood by his
harshest critics). 48 The President of Rutgers University, reflecting on the imperative need for racial preferences, was sufficiently careless to blurt out his regrets over the natural
inferiority of blacks. 49 More circumspect education officials
want to have it both ways: they want to play on-nay, stokepublic fears that blacks cannot compete and be the first to denounce such fears as deeply racist. This combination of nasty,
inflammatory insinuation and righteous indignation is not a
plausible defense of affirmative action.
D. More Lies
While the re-segregation defense appears honest and forthright, it ultimately leads to lies even more brazen than those
that sustained the post-Bakke, pre-Hopwood regime. The proffered benefits of educational diversity-racial integration, harmony, and understanding-depend on at least a credible
pretense of racial fairness and equity. Hopwood, however, has
proven the long-standing suspicion that minority students are
47. Harte-Hanks Texas Poll, June 3-13, 1996. See also Mary Ann Roser, Texans Against Race FactorIn Admissions, Poll Says, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
June 29, 1996, at B1; Anna M. Tinsley, Poll: Few Want QuotaFor College, CORPUS
CHRISTI CALLER-TIMES, June 29, 1996; and Todd Ackerman, Most Oppose Use of
Race in Admissions But Poll Gives Boost to Affirmative Action, HOUSTON CHRONIcLE, June 29, 1996, at A29.
48. Murray has been said to hold the view that blacks are genetically inferior
to whites and Asians. See RicHARD HERRNSTEIN AND CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE (1994). His actual argument is far more complex and nuanced.
49. See Denise K Magner, Chief Under Fire at Rutgers, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., February 10, 1995, at A16.
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admitted under substantially lower standards. Once this is
known, the alleged benefits of diversity dissipate. Non-minority
students are unlikely to accept minority students as equals;
more likely, their attitudes will range from arrogant to condescending. Minority students, for their part, are unlikely to turn
into cheerful ambassadors for racial integration. More likely,
and understandably, they will tend to take umbrage at real or
perceived slights. Most certainly, they will have to deal with
the knowledge that they are expected to do worse than others.
To preserve the ostensible benefits of "diversity," then, the
defenders of affirmative action must continue to deny the existence of racial double standards. To this day, University of
Texas representatives accompany their clamor over "lily-white
law schools" with indignant denials that there were ever any
racial quotas or double standards at the UT Law School. 50 But
one cannot in one breath affirm the imperative for expansive
race preferences and, in the next breath, deny their existence.
Something has got to give.
V.
The resegregation defense must admit the long-denied
existence of the kind of "hard" affirmative action that is opposed
by substantial majorities of voters. It exacerbates the duplicity
and dishonesty that have always been the Achilles heel of affirmative action. Finally, the resegregation defense is unlikely
to gain judicial endorsement and actually tends to expose the
traditional, remedial and "diversity" rationales as pretexts for
the impermissible goal of racial balancing. For all these reasons, the specter of "lily-white" institutions will fail to arrest the
general trend towards colorblind norms and may even accelerate the erosion of public support for racial preferences. What
are the consequences?
Affirmative action advocates are correct that the demise of
racial preferences will (at least in the short term) reduce the
50. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 32, at 20. The University of California at
Berkeley has joined the jeremiad over colorblind "re-segregation," while proudly
waving a "finding" by the Education Department's Office for Civil Rights that the
school's admission policies-under which large numbers of black and Hispanic applicants gain admission-do not discriminate on the basis of race. See, e.g., Olivas,
supra note 30, at B3.
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number of blacks and, to a lesser extent, of Hispanics in elite
institutions. They are also correct in criticizing conservative
5
advocates of colorblindness who fail to confront this reality. '
To be sure, things are not remotely as bleak as the defenders of
the existing quota regime maintain. The demise of racial preferences will occur only over a decade or more, thus dampening
whatever "bleaching effect" an immediate implementation of
colorblind practices would have. Universities will utilize
facially race-neutral admission criteria that serve as proxies for
the forbidden consideration of race. The beneficiaries of racial
preferences, as heretofore administered, will not drop out of
higher education; they will attend other institutions, where
they are more likely to compete and succeed.5 2 While lower minority representation in elite schools may be a social loss, a reduction of the "diversity"-induced mismatch between minority
students and institutions of higher learning would improve minority graduation rates,53 and students and their prospective
employers will be more confident that minority graduates are
not "quota products." But the basic dilemma remains: elite institutions will continue to confront a dearth of highly qualified
black applicants, and they will continue to be torn between the
constitutional demand for colorblindness and the perceived imperative to ensure "fair" minority representation or, as the case
may be, a genuine desire to alleviate racial disparities in educational achievement.
Apart from protracted, acrimonious debate and litigation,
the dilemma between constitutional colorblindness and "fair"
minority representation may easily produce band-aid solutions
and quack remedies, "need-based" or "class-based" affirmative

51. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., Affirmative Action and Doublespeak, LEGAL
May 13, 1996.
52. A prominent member of one of the nation's premier law schools has suggested facetiously to this author that we should pass a constitutional amendment
prohibiting the nation's top ten law schools from using racial preferences. No
other school then would be in need of racial preferences to ensure the desired racial diversity.
53. See, e.g., BOB ZELNICK, BACKFIRE: A REPORTER'S LOOK AT AFFIRMATIVE AcTION 132-34, 155 (minority admission requirements similar to those for whites and
Asians tend to produce higher minority graduation rates than admission systems
with sizeable race preferences).
TIMES,
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action being a prime example. 54 But the urgency of the dilemma also offers an opportunity and an incentive to re-examine the premises that currently underpin the discussion
about affirmative action and higher education-in particular,
the respective roles of private and public institutions.
A.

Give Choice a Chance

The most urgent need is to increase the number of highly
qualified minority applicants to college, in other words, to enhance the achievement level of minority youths. According to
recent studies, private school choice and vouchers provide a
55
promising-perhaps, a singularly promising-way of doing so.
It is true that institutional reforms are no cure-all for deepseated social pathologies or pervasive societal racism. Moreover, there are plausible arguments against (and for) school
choice that have nothing to do with racial considerations. Still,
the teachers' unions, the higher education establishment, and
civil rights groups are not doing anyone a favor by trying to
choke off institutional reforms that may well produce a substantial improvement in minority student achievement.
In the Hopwood litigation, the State of Texas insisted that
the paucity of highly qualified minorities to the Law School was
in large part attributable to the atrocious state of K-12 education. It then cheerfully portrayed the Law School's practice of
setting aside some 25 seats-two-thirds of which went to out-ofstate applicants-as a "remedy" for tens of thousands of black
children trapped in the K-12 system. Having failed in selling
the courts and the public on this absurd and offensive theory,
the Texas establishment and its civil rights cheerleaders would
do well to support institutional reform experiments that may
actually redress the injuries which the state, by its own admis54. This would not be the first time: the hurry to close the gap between the
colorblind language of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and integrationist aspirations
drove America into racial preferences three decades ago. See Andrew Kull, The
Color-Blind Constitution (1992). "Need" or "class" will fail to produce the desired
racial composition in elite institutions (unless these factors are manipulated to
serve as a proxy for race). See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS (1992); Computer
Simulation, supra note 44.
55. See Jay P. Greene and Paul E. Peterson, School Choice Data Rescued
From Bad Science, WALL ST. J., August 14, 1996, at A12.
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sion, continues to inflict on students, especially in the inner
cities.
B.

Representation Versus Elitism

Throughout the Hopwood litigation, UT's representatives
invoked the school's democratic, representational pedigree. In
so doing, they displayed brazen disingenuousness. Supporters
of UT's affirmative action policy argued that because the school
is subsidized "by the taxpayers of our state, the UT Law School
ought to serve all of the racial and ethnic groups that make up
the state's population."56 Evidently, this is best done by extending racial preferences to some "taxpayers" while discriminating against others. Similarly, UT Law professor Douglas
Laycock warned that
[any system of admissions that again produced a substantially
all-white law school would look like a return to Jim Crow. No
amount of explaining... would ever convince minority voters and
taxpayers that their kids were getting a fair shot in our admissions process. A public law school must serve all the people of
57
Texas; equally important, it must be seen to do so.
To paraphrase, Texas minority voters will prefer a flimsy veneer of non-discrimination to the real thing. Moreover, they are
too ignorant to see through a transparent lie and too dense to
have the matter explained to them. Especially from a scholar of
Professor Laycock's integrity and distinction, this is an astounding argument.
Laycock et al. are correct to insist on UT's representational
obligations since, after all, it is a taxpayer-funded institution.
But the problem lies not in squaring representation with racial
integration and fairness; it lies in squaring representation with
elitist aspirations. For all the Hopwood defendants' wailing
that UT Law School would become "lily-white" under race-neutral norms, the school could easily meet its racial diversity goals
by, for example, holding a lottery among all qualified appli56. Barbara Aldave and Al Kauffman, Our Institution Should Offer Equal Opportunity, HOUSTON CHRON., March 28, 1996.
57. Douglas Laycock, UT's Color-ConsciousSystem, TEX. LAw., Nov. 29, 1993,
at 20.
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cants. 58 However, UT Law School, now among the top twenty
law schools in the country, wants to be among the "Top Ten,"
and this ambition requires enrolling the very best students.
Since few of these are members of the preferred minorities, UT
turned to double standards as a means of ensuring "meaningful" racial representation while still maintaining its elitist
aspiration.
This aspiration was the law school's real interest in the
Hopwood litigation. The defendants, however, failed to articulate it, and for good reason: an institutional ambition to compete with Duke, Stanford, and Columbia is hardly a
"compelling" state interest that would justify racial discrimination.59 Especially if racial diversity is as important as the University of Texas has made it out to be, let state institutions be
diverse and representative and let other, private institutions
pursue an elitist mission if they so choose.
C.

Private Versus Public

In the wake of Hopwood, the University of Texas had to
inform donors of race-exclusive minority scholarships that their
grants might be illegal. 60 And after some initial confusion, private universities under the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction decided
that they, too, were bound by Hopwood.61 Just so. These results, however, flow not from Hopwood but from Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, 62 which, in its current form, subjects all but a
58. See Michael E. Rosman, Race-Conscious Admissions In Academia and
Race-Neutral Alternatives, 1 NExus L. REv. 66 (1996). The legitimacy of a lottery
as a race-neutral selection device was recognized recently by the Third Circuit in
Taxman v. Board ofEduc., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996): "Those wiser than we have
advised that 'the lot puts an end to disputes and is decisive in a controversy between the mighty.' Id. at 1551 n.4 (quoting Proverbs 18:18).
59. It may not even be a plausible state interest, for reasons that have nothing
to do with race. For instance, public support for elite institutions probably redistributes income from average taxpayers to the already or future privileged. Perhaps, first-rate public research universities produce sufficient social benefits to
justify such a practice. But it's not obvious that they do, or that privately funded
institutions would fail to provide similar benefits. The case has to be made.
60. See Jim Phillips, Morales: Race Can't Be a Factor, AUSTIN AMERICANSTATESMAN, July 3, 1996, at B6, available in 1996 WL 3435276.
61. See Anna M. Tinsley, Impact of Ruling Widens, INSIDE MEDIA, June 29,
1996 (citing Texas Att'y General Dan Morales who stated that the Hopwood ruling
applied to private universities which accept federal funding).

62. 42 U.S.C. §2000d (1996).
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handful of educational institutions to anti-discrimination
norms.
The time may have come to re-think the scope of Title VI.
It is easy to think of reasons why the federal government must
not lend direct financial support to discriminatory programs or
institutions, as the original Title VI provided. It is much
harder, however, to think of a reason why the law should provide, as it now does, that federal student loans to individuals
who voluntarily sort themselves into various institutions subject each of these institutions to the full rigmarole of civil rights
law.6 3 And why should we prevent private donors from bestow-

ing their beneficence on private recipients who wish to attend
the University of Texas? Perhaps, reducing the scope of Title
VI-for example, by restoring its pre-1987 contours 64 -is a radical proposal. But it does have an appealing political symmetry.65 And surely, a re-examination of Title VI should not seem
63. Of course, the state itself may not discriminate on the basis of race. But
the usual "argument" that we must not tolerate private discrimination begs two
questions. First, it begs the question of why state-created entitlements or disabilities should trump private rights of contract and association. If the answer seems
clear, consider Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (state law mandating
segregation trumps private rights of contract and association). Second, the slogan
of "no discrimination anywhere" begs the question of what we should do when
"non-discrimination" means color blindness to some and racial proportionalism to
others. Over the past three decades, the Left has successfully "solved" this problem by imposing its version of "non-discrimination" on everyone else. In the postHopwood era, the Right may decide to pursue the same strategy. See, e.g., TERRY
EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE, 18990 (1996) (arguing for enforcement of uncomprising colorblindness against private
parties). Either way, though, the attempt to impose universal rules on private
actors is a prescription for perennial strife. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1992).

64. Title VI owes its expansive reach chiefly to the 1987 Civil Rights Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-4a (1996), which, by expanding the definition of the "program or activity" that will trigger the requirements of the Act, "restored" civil
rights to what they had never been before.
65. Liberals would get to keep private affirmative action. Conservatives, at
least those with libertarian leaning, could rejoice over the curtailment of a seemingly impregnable statist regime. Admittedly, reducing the scope of Title VI as
suggested in the text would enable the funding of a whites-only scholarship. But
so what? Should we really hold thousands of foundations, corporations, and individuals, who wish to bestow gifts on minority students without fear of legal complications, hostage to a few racist "crackpots"? I will also admit that it is possible and
even likely that universities would solicit private funds to shield otherwise unconstitutional practices. But there are ways of limiting such abuses. In any event, I
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radical to the State of Texas and to Professor Lawrence Tribe:
they consider Title VI partially unconstitutional. 66
School choice, at least on an experimental basis. A greater
emphasis on the representational function (as opposed to the
elite aspiration) of state institutions. And restrictions on the
scope of Title VI, as it applies to private universities and the
private funding of higher education. In combination, these reforms would avert the (in any event, overblown) menace of
"resegregation" in the wake of Hopwood.
I harbor no illusion that this benefit will be enough to procure the education establishment's support. Since all of the
steps just suggested would endanger the education establishment's power, prestige, and resources, the establishment will
oppose such reforms regardless of their merits. Education leaders and civil rights advocates continue to serve the god of diversity, and they have set their faces like flint. But they may yet
be put to shame-perhaps, as follows:
You have a choice. You can heed the popular and constitutional demand for official colorblindness, re-consider your dogmatic commitment to racial preferences, and help us go about
the difficult business of achieving genuine racial diversity and
integration. Or else, you can engage in massive resistance to
defend "diversity," as you understand it. America has a soft
spot for lost causes, and she will let you fight for "Preferences
Now, Preferences Forever." But the American people do not
like to be lied to, and after years of administering quotas in
drag, you no longer possess the credibility to get away with halftruths, denials, and obfuscation.
Have it your way.

would gladly pay this price in exchange for a step towards limiting civil rights laws
to the public sector.
66. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit at 22-25, Texas v. Hopwood, supra note 15. Judge Sparks
dismissed this claim on remand. Hopwood v. Texas, No. A92-CA-56355 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 12, 1996).
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